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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, THIRD DEPARTMENT
People v. Perkins'
(decided May 21, 2009)
On August 17, 2007, a jury convicted Shawn Perkins "of
criminal possession of a weapon in the second ... and ... third de-
gree[s]." 2  He received concurrent sentences of eight and one-half
years in prison with three and one-half years post-release supervision
on the second-degree charge, and six and one-half years in prison
with three years of post-release supervision on the third degree
charge. Perkins appealed his conviction, but the Appellate Division,
Third Department, unanimously affirmed.4
In September 2006, Perkins "was involved in a verbal con-
frontation" that intensified into gunfire.s Perkins pulled a handgun
and fired twice at the victim. 6 He then fled the scene, leaving the vic-
tim uninjured.7 Perkins was subsequently indicted on various
charges, including "possession of a weapon in the second. . . and ...
third degree[s]." 8 After a jury trial, Perkins was convicted on the two
criminal possession charges. 9
On appeal, Perkins argued that his conviction pursuant to ar-
ticle 265 of the New York Penal Law ("Article 265") violated his
' 880 N.Y.S.2d 209 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2009), appeal denied, 13 N.Y.3d 748 (2009).
2 Id. at 209-10.
' Id. at 210.
4 Id. at 211.
s Id. at 210.
6 Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 210.
7id.
8 Id. Perkins was also indicted on "one count ... of reckless endangerment in the first-
degree, . . . attempted assault in the first-degree, and attempted murder in the second-
degree." Id
9 Id. at 210. At trial, the government dismissed the reckless endangerment charge. Per-
kins, 880 N.Y.S. at 210 n.1. Also, the jury acquitted Perkins of the charges of attempted as-
sault in the first-degree and attempted murder in the second-degree. Id. at 210.
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rights under the United States Constitution,to and section four of the
New York Civil Rights Law ("CRL")." More specifically, Perkins
argued that in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
District of Columbia v. Hellerl2 he had a constitutionally protected
right to bear arms in his home for self-defense purposes, and that Ar-
ticle 265 created a total ban on handgun possession; therefore, he ar-
gued his conviction violated his constitutional rights.'3
The court disagreed and acknowledged that although the Hel-
ler Court concluded that the Second Amendment protects an individ-
ual's right to bear arms in the home for self-defense, it is not an abso-
lute right but one that "may be limited by reasonable governmental
restrictions."l 4  The Appellate Division, Third Department, distin-
guished the challenged statutes in Heller" from Article 265, which,
the court said, is not a total ban on the right to possess handguns, and
therefore does not constitute a "severe restriction" on Perkins'
Second Amendment right.16 The court also reaffirmed New York's
firearm licensing requirement as an acceptable regulation of handgun
possession and stated that it "will not contravene Heller so long as it
is not enforced in an arbitrary and capricious manner."17
Perkins was not home during the crime, and, more important-
ly, he "did not have a valid pistol permit."' 8 Based on these facts, the
court concluded that Perkins' constitutional challenge was meritless
"[i]nasmuch as the relevant sections of the Penal Law are constitu-
tionally sound and [his] conduct did not conform to that which is pro-
tected by the Second Amendment" or section four of the CRL.19
In Heller, the United States Supreme Court extensively dis-
cussed the Second Amendment right to bear arms. The respondent,
Dick Heller, was denied a handgun registration certificate by the Dis-
10 U.S. CONST. amend. II, states: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security
of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
1 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 4 (McKinney 1909) states: "A well regulated militia being ne-
cessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms cannot be
infringed." See also Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 210.
12 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
13 Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 210.
14 Id at 210 (citing Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816).
5 See infra note 22.
16 Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 210 (internal quotations omitted).
1 Id. (citing Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2819).
18 Id
'9 Id at 210.
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trict of Columbia. 20 He subsequently filed a federal lawsuit in which
he sought to enjoin the District of Columbia from enforcing three gun
control statutes. 2' The district court dismissed the complaint,2 2 but
the court of appeals reversed.23 In reversing, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held that an individual has the right to pos-
sess firearms under the Second Amendment "and that the city's total
ban on handguns, as well as its requirement that firearms in the home
be kept nonfunctional even when necessary for self-defense, violated
that right." 24 Recognizing the constitutional magnitude of the issue,
the Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari.25
The limited scope of the issue presented to the Supreme Court
was whether a prohibition against an operable handgun in an individ-
ual's "home violates the Second Amendment."26 In a five to four de-
cision written by Justice Scalia,27 the majority held that a prohibition
against the possession of handguns in an individual's home, as well
as a prohibition against keeping a lawful gun operable for self-
defense purposes, violates the Second Amendment.28
In reaching this conclusion, the Court first discussed the
meaning of the Second Amendment and analyzed the parties' com-
peting interpretations of the amendment.29 After a thorough discus-
sion of the historical background of the Second Amendment, the
Court determined that it "guarantee[s] the individual [the] right to
20 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788.
21 Id. See also D.C. CODE § 7-2502.01 (a) (2009) ("[N]o person .. . in the District [of Co-
lumbia] shall possess or control any firearm, unless the person . .. holds a valid registration
certificate for the firearm."); D.C. CODE § 7-2502.02 (a) (4) (2001) ("A registration certifi-
cate shall not be issued for a [p]istol not validly registered to the current registrant in the Dis-
trict ..... ); D.C. CODE § 7-2507.02 (a) (2001) ("It shall be the policy of the District . .. that
each registrant should keep any firearm in his or her possession unloaded and either disas-
sembled or secured by a trigger lock, gun safe, locked box, or other secure device."). These
statutes were found by the Heller Court to violate the Second Amendment.
22 See Parker v. District of Columbia (Parker 1), 311 F. Supp. 2d 103, 109 (D.D.C. 2004),
rev'd and remanded, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
23 Parker v. District of Columbia (Parker II), 478 F.3d 370, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
24 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788 (citing Parker II, 478 F.3d at 395, 399-401).
25 id.
26 Id. at 2787-88.
27 See id. at 2787.
28 Id. at 2821-22.
29 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2789. The District of Columbia argued that the Second Amend-
ment only applies "in connection with militia service," as opposed to Heller's interpretation
that the right applies to individuals unconnected with militia service and for "lawful purpos-
es, such as self-defense within the home." Id.
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possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation."3 0 However, the
Court was careful to recognize that although it is "a pre-existing
right,"' it does have its limitations.32
Heller made clear that the right of self-defense is fundamental
to the Second Amendment, and laws that prohibit an individual from
maintaining an operable handgun in their own home to protect that
right is unconstitutional.33 Although the Heller Court conceded that
handgun violence is rampant and has plagued this country for years,
the Court recognized that there are other ways to regulate handguns
when it stated, "the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily
takes certain policy choices off the table. These include the absolute
prohibition of handguns held and used for self-defense in the
home."34 Even though absolute prohibitions are unconstitutional,
some restrictions are permissible and, arguably necessary. Examples
of permissible restrictions include, "prohibitions on the possession
... by felons and the mentally ill, ... laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places . . . , [and] laws imposing conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms."s
When the Court analyzed the challenged statutes, it found that
the requirement to keep handguns inoperable in the home created a
total ban on a certain class of guns.36 This class of handguns is the
most popular type used by Americans for the lawful purpose of "self-
defense in the home." 37 Furthermore, a handgun is a common type to
use in self-defense situations in the home; it is easy to handle, quickly
"accessible in an emergency," and it can be held while a person
phones the police.3 8  Significantly, the Court noted that the chal-
lenged statutes would not pass any standard of scrutiny used in a con-
stitutional challenge.39
30 Id. at 2797.
31 id.
32 Id at 2799.
33 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817-18.
34 Id. at 2822.
35 Id. at 2817. Two examples of sensitive places the Court mentioned include "schools
and government buildings." Id. See also People v. Ferguson, No. 2008QN036911, 2008
WL 4694552, at *1 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. Oct. 24, 2008) (recognizing an airport as a sensitive
place).
36 Id. at 2817.
3 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2818.
38 Id. at 2818.
'9 Id. at 2817-18.
790 [Vol. 26
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Heller does have its criticisms, however. The dissenters cau-
tioned that the majority was declaring a new constitutional right-to
keep and bear arms for a private use-that does not comport with the
original understanding of the Second Amendment. 4 0  Furthermore,
the dissenters were concerned that "the scope of permissible regula-
tions" is left for future judicial review and, more importantly, that it
could lead to a slippery slope.4 ' In a separate opinion, Justice Breyer
disagreed with the majority and noted that the District's ban on hand-
guns was a well-reasoned decision that was a necessary response to
an alarming number of handguns that were present in a high-crime
area.4 2 The legislative intent in passing the challenged statutes was to
decrease a life-threatening problem.43
The life-threatening problem referred to by the dissent is well
documented. A discussion of handgun violence statistics reveals that
handguns play a major role in crime and death." "From 1993 to
1997, there were 180,533 firearm-related deaths in the United
States."45 Approximately 50% were suicides, while "44% were ho-
micides."46 More troubling is that one out of every eight firearm re-
lated deaths were persons "under the age of [twenty;]" further
"[flirearm-related deaths account for 22.5% of all injury deaths" of
40 Id. at 2846 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41 Id. The dissenters were troubled by the majority's interpretation that the Second
Amendment meant the right to possess handguns for a private purpose because it "upsets
[the] settled understanding" of the amendment. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2846. Prior to Heller it
was understood that legislatures were free to regulate handgun possession, provided that the
well-regulated militia is preserved; however, it is now left to future courts to determine the
scope of the new meaning. Id The dissenters were concerned that the need for self-defense
frequently arises outside the home; therefore, the dissenters fear that the right to possess a
handgun in the home for self-defense will soon be expanded to locations outside of the
home. Id. Furthermore, the dissent asserted that the Court should be cautious in entering a
"political thicket" concerning the debate of gun control when the political process has not
been questioned; instead, the Court should adhere "to a policy of judicial restraint" rather
than announcing bold policy choices today. Id. at 2846 n.39.
42 Id. at 2847 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[T]he District's regulation, which focuses upon the
presence of handguns in high-crime urban areas, represents a permissible legislative re-
sponse to a serious, indeed life-threatening, problem.").
43 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2847.
44 See id. at 2856-57.
45 Id. at 2856. See generally MARIANNE W. ZAWITZ & KEVIN J. STROM, UNITED STATES
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FIREARM INJURY AND DEATH FROM
CRIME, 1993-97 (2000),http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/content/pub/pdf/fidc9397.pdf.
46 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2856 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
2010] 791
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individuals nineteen years old or younger.47 The Court recognized
that these statistics represent a disturbing problem in America, which
requires reasonable restrictions on the possession of handguns in or-
der to curtail the unfortunate number of handgun related deaths.48
Interestingly, Heller limits only Congress' powers, but not
those of the individual states.49 It was already settled in United States
v. Cruikshank,50 that the right "means no more than that it shall not be
infringed by Congress."' Each state is allowed to either restrict or
protect its citizens under its own police powers. 52 However, the lan-
guage of section four of the CRL in New York is substantially similar
to the Second Amendment and is interpreted the same way. 3
In Maloney v. Cuomo, 54 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed the constitutionality of Article 265 and held that it does
"not violate the Second Amendment."5 5 James Maloney was arrested
and charged with possession of a weapon after being in possession of
a chuka stick.56 The charge was subsequently dismissed as a result of
Maloney's guilty plea to disorderly conduct and his agreement to de-
stroy the weapon.5 7 Maloney then filed a lawsuit that sought a decla-
47 id.
48 See id. at 2816-17 (majority opinion).
49 Id. at 2813.
50 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
SId. at 553.
52 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2813.
5 Moore v. Gallup, 45 N.Y.S.2d 63, 66 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1943) ("[Aluthoritative Fed-
eral decisions construing the Second Amendment may properly be applied to the State sta-
tute in the interest of homogeneity of interpretation."). See also Citizens for a Safer Cmty. v.
City of Rochester, 627 N.Y.S.2d 193, 198 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1994) ("The [c]ourts of
this State have concluded that the language of federal law interpreting the Second Amend-
ment (which is identical in its language to Article 2, § 4 of the Civil Rights Law) should be
used in interpreting the provisions of this state law.").
54 554 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
15 Id. at 59.
56 Id. at 58. See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.01 (1) (McKinney 2008) which provides, in
pertinent part: "A person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree
when: [h]e or she possesses any. . . chuka stick ..... A chuka stick, also known as a "nun-
chaku," is:
[A]ny device designed primarily as a weapon, consisting of two or more
lengths of a rigid material joined together by a thong, rope or chain in
such a manner as to allow free movement of a portion of the device
while held in the hand and capable of being rotated in such a manner as
to inflict serious injury upon a person by striking or choking.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.00 (14) (McKinney 2008).
5 Maloney, 554 F.3d at 58.
6
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ration that Article 265 was unconstitutional because it prohibited the
"possession of nunchakus in [his] home."5 8  The district court dis-
missed the complaint on the ground that "the Second Amendment
does not apply to the states"; therefore, New York is not precluded
from imposing its own regulations on the possession of chuka
sticks.59
Maloney appealed and argued that the ban violated his
Second Amendment right because there is no rational basis for the
prohibition under the Fourteenth Amendment. 60 The Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's ruling with respect to the Second
Amendment irrespective of the Heller decision, because the Second
Amendment does not apply to the states. 6 1 Even though Heller struck
down statutes that placed a total ban on handguns, the Court did not
address the issue of whether the Second Amendment is incorporated
into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.62 Since
states can impose reasonable restrictions on handguns, Article 265
does not violate the Second Amendment because it does not create a
total prohibition on handguns.63
The court also found a rational basis for Article 265 in its leg-
islative history.64 " 'Legislative acts that do not interfere with fun-
damental rights or single out suspect classifications carry with them a
strong presumption of constitutionality and must be upheld if ration-
ally related to a legitimate state interest.' "65 At the time the statute
was being debated, letters were mailed to the Legislature that stated
that chuka sticks are the cause of serious injuries and are primarily
" 'used by muggers and street gangs.' ,66 Furthermore, the weapon
serves no legitimate purpose other than to injure or, in some cases,
59 Id.
o id.
60 id.
61 Id. (citing Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886)). The Court in Presser noted "the
[Second] [A]mendment is a limitation only upon the power of [C]ongress and the national
government, and not upon that of the state." Presser, 116 U.S. at 265.
62 Maloney, 554 F.3d at 59; Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2813 n.23.
63 Maloney, 554 F.3d at 58-59.
6 Id. at 59.
65 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Beatie v. City of New York, 123 F.3d 707,
711 (2d Cir. 1997)).
66 Id. (quoting Memorandum from Arty. Gen. Louis J. Lefkowitz to the Governor (Apr. 8,
1974)).
2010] 793
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kill a person.67 Although Maloney argued that the ban would inhibit
martial artists' use of chuka sticks in training programs, the court de-
clined to recognize this single purpose as sufficient to overcome the
burden of showing " 'that there is no rational relationship between
the legislation and a legitimate legislative purpose.' "68
The Heller Court's reference to "sensitive places" is one ex-
ample of many permissible regulations the government may constitu-
tionally impose on the possession of firearms. 69 In People v. Fergu-
son,70 the court upheld the constitutionality of Article 265 that was
enforced in arguably one of the most "sensitive places"-an airport.7 1
The defendant, William Ferguson, was traveling home to California
from New York while in possession of a handgun. 72 Although Fer-
guson had a valid license to carry the handgun in California, he did
not have a license to possess it in New York.7 3 After Ferguson in-
formed an American Airlines agent that he had a gun in his posses-
sion, a police officer searched his bag. 74 He was subsequently ar-
rested and "charged with [c]riminal [p]ossession of a [w]eapon in the
[flourth [d]egree.75 In his omnibus motion, Ferguson sought a decla-
ration that Article 265 was unconstitutional.76
In support of his motion, Ferguson specifically argued that he
had a license to carry the gun in California, he was properly trained to
use the handgun, and it was unloaded while he possessed it in New
York.77 Moreover, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Hel-
ler, he argued that his right to carry a handgun for protection was vi-
olated.7 8 However, the challenged statutes in Heller were clearly dis-
tinguishable because " '[flew laws in the history of our nation have
come close to the severe restriction of the District[sic] [of Colum-
bia's] handgun ban.' "7 In dismissing Ferguson's claim, the court
67 Maloney, 554 F.3d at 59.
68 Id. at 59-60 (quoting Beatie, 123 F.3d at 711).
69 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816-17.
7o No. 2008QN036911, 2008 WL 4694552, at *1 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. Oct. 24, 2008).
71 Id. at *4.
72 Id. at *1, *2.
7 Id. at *1.
74 id.
7 Ferguson, 2008 WL 4694552, at *1.
76 Id. at *1.
n Id. at *2.
78 Id. at *3.
79 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2818).
8
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referenced Heller's proposition for the permissible prohibition of
firearms in "sensitive places."so It reasoned that an airport is consi-
dered a sensitive place, and such regulatory measures on the posses-
sion of handguns are essential to the safety and security of the pub-
lic.8 ' Furthermore, the court noted that Ferguson was not in his home
at the time of his arrest; therefore, his argument that the law infringed
upon his right to carry a handgun for self-defense was not afforded
the Heller protection.82 Again, the court upheld the constitutionality
of Article 265 as it does not constitute a total ban on the possession of
handguns, and therefore is not a "severe restriction."8 3
As the Heller Court pointed out, a state's handgun possession
law will not violate the Second Amendment unless the law is " 'en-
forced in an arbitrary and capricious manner.' ,84 In People v. Abdul-
lah," New York's firearm licensing requirement was not enforced
arbitrarily or capriciously when the defendant was arrested following
a violation of a temporary order of protection and who was then
charged with criminal possession of a handgun. 86 A police officer re-
sponded to the temporary order of protection violation and arrived at
Abdullah's home. Abdullah told the officer that he had a weapon in
his kitchen.8 8 The officer seized a handgun, arrested Abdullah, and
charged him with criminal possession of a handgun in the fourth de-
gree.89
Abdullah argued that the possession charge violated his
Second Amendment right to bear arms in his home for self-defense,
and that the city's requirement for handgun licenses was enforced in
an arbitrary and capricious manner.90 The court disagreed and upheld
New York's handgun regulations as reasonable governmental restric-
tions.91 Although the court did not directly address Abdullah's argu-
80 Ferguson, 2008 WL 4694552 at *4 (internal quotations omitted).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
84 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2819 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 74-75, Heller, 128
S. Ct. 2783 (No. 07-290)).
81 870 N.Y.S.2d 886 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2008).
86 Id at 887.
87 id
88 id
89 Id.
90 Abdullah, 850 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
9' Id. at 887.
2010] 795
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ment that the gun licensing process was enforced in an arbitrary and
capricious manner, the court cited New York's gun licensing statute,
which provides the requirements for a license to be issued.92 Because
there was a temporary order of protection issued against Abdullah,
his right to possess a handgun was suspended. 93 Therefore, it could
hardly be said that New York's gun licensing statute was enforced
arbitrarily or capriciously when the statute expressly prohibits pos-
session of a handgun by those who have a temporary order of protec-
tion issued against them. The court concluded by saying that it is a
criminal act to possess a handgun unless an individual has a valid li-
cense, and that Article 265 is not unconstitutional as violating the
Second Amendment. 94
In People v. Handsome,95 the New York City Criminal Court
elaborated on the factors that police commissioners may consider
when determining whether to grant a handgun license to an appli-
cant.96 In Handsome, the police obtained a warrant to search Hand-
some's apartment based upon information that he possessed wea-
pons. 97 The police seized three handguns and ammunition from the
apartment. Handsome "was charged with three counts of [c]riminal
[p]ossession of a [w]eapon in the [f]ourth [d]egree." 99 He argued that
Article 265 was unconstitutional because it violated his Second
Amendment right in light of Parker v. District of Columbia.'o
92 Id. See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00 (McKinney 2005) which provides, in pertinent
parts:
No license shall be issued . . . except for an applicant (a) twenty-one
years of age or older ... ; (b) of good moral character; (c) who has not
been convicted anywhere of a felony or a serious offense; (d) who has
stated whether he or she has ever suffered any mental illness . . . ; (e)
who has not had a license revoked or who is not under a suspension ...
order issued pursuant to ... section 530.14 of the criminal procedure law
... ; (g) concerning whom no good cause exists for the denial of the li-
cense.
9 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.14 (1) (a) (McKinney 2007) which provides, in pertinent
part: "Whenever a temporary order of protection is issued ... the court shall suspend any
such existing [handgun] license possessed by the defendant ... and order the immediate sur-
render of any or all firearms owned or possessed ..... "
94 Abdullah, 870 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
9 846 N.Y.S.2d 852 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2007).
96 See id. at 861.
9 Id at 853.
98 Id
9 Id.
100 Handsome, 870 N.Y.S.2d at 853; see also Parker H1, 478 F.3d at 395. At the time of
796 [Vol. 26
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Handsome's argument was problematic because he claimed
that his Second Amendment right was violated despite his failure to
apply for a handgun license.'o' The court reasoned that judicial re-
view was available if Handsome had applied for and been denied a
handgun license.102 If Handsome had applied for a license, the police
commissioner would have considered a number of factors, including
his age,103 employment, high school attendance status, and residence
in a New York City Housing Authority property among "many young
children and senior citizens." 04 Furthermore, the government ob-
tained information during discovery that provided that he was "a
member of an organized gang."' 05
The court recognized that it is quite possible that Handsome
would have been denied a license because he was under the minimum
age imposed by the licensing statutes, he lived in public housing, and
he was an alleged gang member.106 More importantly, it would hard-
ly be an arbitrary and capricious enforcement of Article 400 of the
Penal Law or a violation of Handsome's Second Amendment right
when he does not fit the class of persons that the statute permits to
possess handguns.1 0 7 The court concluded by noting that Article 265
"was enacted pursuant to the State's police power, and is more than
rationally related to the end it seeks to accomplish, limiting gun vi-
olence and accidents which have caused many deaths and injuries."' 0 8
When supported by a rational basis, the denial of a pistol li-
cense will not violate the Second Amendment.' 09 In Wisotsky v.
Kelly, Wisotsky applied for a premises residence license for a hand-
gun and was approved." 0 In support of his application he noted that
Handsome, the Supreme Court had not yet decided Heller, but Parker was affirmed on ap-
peal. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788.
1o1 Handsome, 870 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
102 id.
103 Handsome was only nineteen years old at the time. Id.
10 Id.
105 Id.
106 Handsome, 870 N.Y.S.2d at 861
107 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400 (1) (McKINNEY 2007), which provides, in pertinent part:
"No license shall be issued ... except for an applicant (a) twenty-one years of age or old-
er...."
108 Handsome, 846 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
109 Wisotsky v. Kelly, No. 104213/09, 2009 WL 1620181, at *5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
June 2, 2009).
"o Id. at *1.
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he was a personal security guard for David Rockefeller, a retired war-
rant officer, and was a former "United States Marine . . . for twenty
years" before being involuntarily discharged for unacceptable con-
duct."' A few months later, Wisotsky was "charged with criminal
possession of a weapon in the third degree[,] . . . criminal impersona-
tion in the third degree[,] ... and assault in the third degree."ll 2 Al-
though the charges were ultimately dismissed, two orders of protec-
tion were issued against Wisotsky in favor of the complaining
witnesses in the criminal case." 3
Wisotsky re-applied for a premises residence license after the
charges were dismissed, but his application was denied.1 4 In deny-
ing his application, the license division stated that the criminal
charges against him were "disturbing," and that he exercised "poor
judgment" when he carried his unsecured handgun outside the pres-
ence of the home in direct violation of his handgun license."s A sub-
sequent appeal of his license denial was also dismissed, and in dis-
missing, the license division noted that he "fail[ed] to disclose the
prior orders of protection" issued against him." 6
Wisotsky then commenced an Article 78 proceeding to show
cause as to the denial of the license. " He argued that the license di-
vision's decision to deny his application was arbitrary and capricious
because the criminal charges were dismissed, he had twenty years of
military service, he was currently employed as a personal security
guard, and the denial violated his Second Amendment right." 8
The decision to deny a premises residence license will stand
unless the decision was arbitrary and capricious; thus, the decision is
proper when "supported by a rational basis.""'9 The license division
found numerous reasons to deny the license, including the violation
of his original license restriction, which led to criminal charges, and
the failure to disclose three orders of protection against him when he
t' Id
112 id
"3 Id. at *3.
114 Wisotsky, 2009 WL 1620181, at *3.
115 Id.
116 Id at *4.
118 ido
"9 Wisotsky, 2009 WL 1620181, at *5.
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re-applied for the license.120 Although Wisotsky did have an other-
wise stellar background and provided analogous cases in which ap-
plicants with more troubling backgrounds were given licenses, there
is no authority that says an applicant is always "entitled to a second
chance."l 2 ' Furthermore, there are numerous factors to consider
when deciding whether to deny a handgun license, which include the
need to have a license and other mitigating factors.122
Future courts will be well guided by consistent decisions that
uphold the constitutionality of Article 265, because in almost all of
the decisions there was a clear violation of Article 265 or a rational
basis to deny a handgun license. As Heller pointed out, regulations
of handguns are necessary for the safety of the citizens of this coun-
try. Ferguson is a prime example of a reasonable restriction that is
important for the safety and security of the public in sensitive places.
Reasonable people will continue to disagree regarding handgun re-
strictions, but they are arguably necessary in airports for the safety of
travelers. Without these restrictions, the troubling statistics that Hel-
ler referenced will continue to worsen.
New York should continue to implement regulations that only
allow responsible persons the right to possess a handgun for self-
defense purposes in the home. Wisotsky is important to show that
even a stellar background can be negated by one criminal act. Wi-
sotsky clearly did not exemplify the high level of responsibility that
comes with possessing a handgun when he was charged with a crime
directly related to his illegal use of a weapon. Article 400 of the Pen-
al Law, therefore, is significant to protect the public from people like
Wisotsky, who at one time satisfied the requirements to possess a
handgun, but now clearly should not enjoy that right. Similarly, Ab-
dullah and Handsome are important cases to show that those who are
subjected to criminal prosecutions do not deserve to possess hand-
120 Id. at *5-6.
121 Id. at *6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
122 Id. Although courts normally take into account various factors to determine whether
the grant or denial of a license is proper, one criminal act can negate an otherwise unble-
mished record. See, e.g., Tolliver v. Kelly, 837 N.Y.S.2d 128, 130 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
2007) (reversing the decision to grant petitioner's handgun license because his "unblemished
record of outstanding character . .. his military service, [and] his higher education" was ne-
gated by a criminal conviction, which evidenced "a startling lack of judgment") (internal qu-
otation marks omitted).
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guns because they are not "of good moral character." 23 Consistent
decisions upholding the constitutionality of Article 265 as well as the
imposition of harsh criminal sentences in different factual scenarios
will further serve New York's determination to have strict handgun
laws and act as a general deterrent to future persons who are consi-
dering violating the handgun laws.
However, at the same time, denying a handgun license to Ab-
dullah after the criminal charges were dropped is contrary to the ex-
press language of Article 400 of the Penal Law that those convicted
of a felony or serious offense are precluded from possessing a hand-
gun.124 A decision like this casts doubt on New York's ability to rec-
ognize that citizens are capable of rehabilitation and can earn the
right to possess a handgun again. This, at first read, can be quite
troubling when our criminal justice system encourages rehabilitation,
but Handsome showed that judicial review is still available to appeal
the decision. This will provide individuals another opportunity to ar-
gue why they deserve a handgun license and will serve as a check on
determinations made by the police commissioner.
As long as future courts properly apply the rational basis test
as they did in Wisotsky, New York residents should feel confident
that courts only grant licenses to responsible individuals who are "of
good moral character," and where there is otherwise "no good cause
... for the denial of the license."l25  When this is done, the tragic
handgun statistics reported in Heller should improve, and people sim-
ilar to the victim in Perkins will be protected from violent criminals
because article 265 is rationally related to the ends it seeks to accom-
plish-the protection of the public from handgun violence.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in McDo-
nald v. City of Chicagol26 to decide the question left open in Heller-
whether the Second Amendment is incorporated into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.127 The decision is expected by
the summer of 2010. In McDonald, the National Rifle Association
123 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00 (1) (b).
124 Id. § 400.00 (1) (c).
125 Id. § 400.00 (1) (b), (g).
126 Nat'l Rife Ass'n v. Chicago, 567 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, McDonald v.
City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009).
127 Heller, 128 S Ct. at 2813 n.23; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Nat'1 Rifle
Ass'n v. Chicago, 2009 WL 1556563 (U.S. June 3, 2009) (No. 08-1497).
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filed a complaint alleging that certain Chicago ordinances prohibited
the possession of handguns in the home, in violation of Heller.128
The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the Second
Amendment does not apply to the states, and the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that only the Supreme Court can
decide whether the Second Amendment is incorporated into the Four-
teenth Amendment.129
McDonald is significant; it will likely determine whether the
Second Amendment is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Stevens questioned the scope of the right established in Hel-
ler-is it the right to possess a handgun in the home, or is it more ex-
pansive to include the right to possess a handgun on the street?' 30
Given the numerous issues regarding the scope of the Second
Amendment, the Justices will likely remand the case with guidance
on what types of reasonable restrictions will be constitutionally per-
missible.' 3 In New York, if the Supreme Court does incorporate the
Second Amendment, there will likely be an influx of litigation chal-
lenging the constitutionality of article 265 of the Penal Law. The im-
plications of McDonald could be far-reaching and could significantly
change the constitutionality of New York's restrictions on the posses-
sion of handguns.
Brian Shupak
128 Nat'1Rifle Ass'n, 567 F.3d at 857.
129 Id. at 857, 860.
130 Adam Liptak, Justices Seem to Lean Toward Extending Individual Right to Own Guns,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar 3, 2010 at A14.
131 The Second Amendment's Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2010 at A22.
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